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Cooperative encoding for secrecy in interference
channels
O. Ozan Koyluoglu and Hesham El Gamal
Abstract
This paper investigates the fundamental performance limits of the two-user interference channel in the presence
of an external eavesdropper. In this setting, we construct an inner bound, to the secrecy capacity region, based
on the idea of cooperative encoding in which the two users cooperatively design their randomized codebooks and
jointly optimize their channel prefixing distributions. Our achievability scheme also utilizes message-splitting in
order to allow for partial decoding of the interference at the non-intended receiver. Outer bounds are then derived
and used to establish the optimality of the proposed scheme in certain cases. In the Gaussian case, the previously
proposed cooperative jamming and noise-forwarding techniques are shown to be special cases of our proposed
approach. Overall, our results provide structural insights on how the interference can be exploited to increase the
secrecy capacity of wireless networks.
Index Terms
Cooperative encoding, information theoretic security, interference channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Without the secrecy constraint, the interference channel has been investigated extensively in the litera-
ture. The best known achievable region was obtained in [2] and was recently simplified in [3]. However,
except for some special cases (e.g., [4]–[8]), characterizing the capacity region of the two-user Gaussian
interference channel remains as an open problem. On the other hand, recent attempts have shed light
on the fundamental limits of the interference channels with confidential messages [9]–[12]. Nonetheless,
the external eavesdropper scenario, the model considered here, has not been addressed adequately in the
literature. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, the only relevant work is the recent study on the achievable
secure degrees of freedom (DoF) of the K-user Gaussian interference channels under a frequency selective
fading model [11], [12].
This work develops a general approach for cooperative encoding for the (discrete) two-user memoryless
interference channels operated in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. The proposed scheme allows
for cooperation in two distinct ways:
1) The two users jointly optimize their randomized (two-dimensional) codebooks [13], and
2) The two users jointly introduce randomness in the transmitted signals, to confuse the eavesdropper,
via a cooperative channel prefixing approach [14].
Remarkably, the two methods, respectively, are helpful in adding decodable and undecodable random-
ness to the channel. The proposed scheme also utilizes message-splitting and partial decoding to enlarge
the achievable secrecy rate region [2]. We then derive outer bounds to the secrecy capacity region and
use them to establish the optimality of the proposed scheme for some classes of channels. In addition, we
argue that some coding techniques for the secure discrete multiple access channel and relay-eavesdropper
channel can be obtained as special cases of our cooperative encoding approach.
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2Recently, noise forwarding (or jamming) has been shown to enhance the achievable secrecy rate region
of several Gaussian multi-user channels (e.g., [15] , [16]). The basic idea is to allow each transmitter
to allocate only a fraction of the available power for its randomized codebook and use the rest for the
generation of independent noise samples. The superposition of the two signals is then transmitted. With the
appropriate power allocation policy, one can ensure that the jamming signal results in maximal ambiguity
at the eavesdropper while incuring only a minimal loss in the achievable rate at the legitimate receiver(s).
Our work reveals the fact that this noise injection technique can be obtained as a manifestation of the
cooperative channel prefixing approach. Based on this observation, we obtain a larger achievable region
for the secrecy rate in the Gaussian multiple access channel.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II is devoted to the discrete memoryless scenario
where the main results of the paper are derived and few special cases are analyzed. The analysis for the
Gaussian channels, along with numerical results in selected scenarios, are given in Section III. Finally,
we offer some concluding remarks in Section IV. The proofs are collected in the appendices to enhance
the flow of the paper.
II. SECURITY FOR THE DISCRETE MEMORYLESS INTERFERENCE CHANNEL
A. System Model and Notations
Throughout this paper, vectors are denoted as xi = {x(1), · · · , x(i)}, where we omit the subscript i if
i = n, i.e., x = {x(1), · · · , x(n)}. Random variables are denoted with capital letters X , which are defined
over sets denoted by the calligraphic letters X , and random vectors are denoted as bold-capital letters Xi.
Again, we drop the subscript i for X = {X(1), · · · , X(n)}. We define, [x]+ , max{0, x}, α¯ , 1−α, and
γ(x) , 1
2
log2(1+x). The delta function δ(x) is defined as δ(x) = 1, if x = 0; δ(x) = 0, if x 6= 0. Also, we
use the following shorthand for probability distributions: p(x) , p(X = x), p(x|y) , p(X = x|Y = y).
The same notation will be used for joint distributions. For any randomized codebook, we construct 2nR
rows (corresponding to message indices) and 2nRx codewords per row (corresponding to randomization
indices), where we refer to R as the secrecy rate and Rx as the randomization rate. (Please refer to Fig. 1.)
Finally, for a given set S, RS ,
∑
i∈S
Ri for secrecy rates and RxS ,
∑
i∈S
Rxi for the randomization rates.
Our discrete memoryless two-user interference channel with an (external) eavesdropper (IC-E) is denoted
by
(X1 ×X2, p(y1, y2, ye|x1, x2),Y1 × Y2 ×Ye),
for some finite sets X1,X2,Y1,Y2,Ye (see Fig. 2). Here the symbols (x1, x2) ∈ X1 × X2 are the channel
inputs and the symbols (y1, y2, ye) ∈ Y1 × Y2 × Ye are the channel outputs observed at the decoder 1,
decoder 2, and at the eavesdropper, respectively. The channel is memoryless and time-invariant:
p(y1(i), y2(i), ye(i)|xi1,xi2,yi−11 ,yi−12 ,yi−1e ) = p(y1(i), y2(i), ye(i)|x1(i), x2(i)).
We assume that each transmitter k ∈ {1, 2} has a secret message Wk which is to be transmitted to
the respective receiver in n channel uses and to be secured from the eavesdropper. In this setting, an
(n,M1,M2, Pe,1, Pe,2) secret codebook has the following components:
1) The secret message set Wk = {1, ...,Mk}; k = 1, 2.
2) A stochastic encoding function fk(.) at transmitter k which maps the secret messages to the
transmitted symbols: fk : wk → Xk for each wk ∈ Wk; k = 1, 2.
3) Decoding function φk(.) at receiver k which maps the received symbols to an estimate of the message:
φk(Yk) = wˆk; k = 1, 2.
The reliability of transmission is measured by the following probabilities of error
Pe,k =
1
M1M2
∑
(w1,w2)∈W1×W2
Pr
{
φk(Yk) 6= wk|(w1, w2) is sent
}
,
31
N
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Fig. 1. Randomized codebook of Wyner. For a given message index, a column is randomly chosen, and the corresponding channel input
is transmitted. Designing the number of columns properly is the key to prove that the security constraint is met. We refer to this codebook
as randomized (two-dimensional) codebook.
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Fig. 2. The discrete memoryless interference channel with an eavesdropper (IC-E).
for k = 1, 2. The secrecy is measured by the equivocation rate
1
n
H (W1,W2|Ye) .
We say that the rate tuple (R1, R2) is achievable for the IC-E if, for any given ǫ > 0, there exists an
(n,M1,M2, Pe,1, Pe,2) secret codebook such that,
1
n
log(M1) = R1
1
n
log(M2) = R2,
max{Pe,1, Pe,2} ≤ ǫ,
and
R1 +R2 − 1
n
H (W1,W2|Ye) ≤ ǫ (1)
for sufficiently large n. The secrecy capacity region is the closure of the set of all achievable rate pairs
(R1, R2) and is denoted as CIC-E. Finally, we note that the secrecy requirement imposed on the full
message set implies the secrecy of individual messages. In other words, 1
n
I(W1,W2;Ye) ≤ ǫ implies
1
n
I(Wk;Ye) ≤ ǫ for k = 1, 2.
4B. Inner Bound
In this section, we introduce the cooperative encoding scheme, and derive an inner bound to CIC-E. The
proposed strategy allows for cooperation in design of the randomized codebooks, as well as in channel
prefixing [14]. This way, each user will add only a sufficient amount of randomness as the other user will
help to increase the randomness seen by the eavesdropper. The achievable secrecy rate region using this
approach is stated in the following result.
Theorem 1:
RIC-E , the closure of
{⋃
p∈P
R(p)
}
⊂ CIC-E, (2)
where P denotes the set of all joint distributions of the random variables Q, C1, S1, O1, C2, S2, O2, X1,
X2 that factors as 1
p(q, c1, s1, o1, c2, s2, o2, x1, x2) = p(q)p(c1|q)p(s1|q)p(o1|q)p(c2|q)p(s2|q)p(o2|q)
p(x1|c1, s1, o1)p(x2|c2, s2, o2), (3)
and R(p) is the closure of all (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 = RC1 +RS1 ,
R2 = RC2 +RS2 ,
(RC1 , R
x
C1
, RS1 , R
x
S1
, RC2 , R
x
C2
, RxO2) ∈ R1(p),
(RC2 , R
x
C2
, RS2 , R
x
S2
, RC1 , R
x
C1
, RxO1) ∈ R2(p),
(RxC1 , R
x
S1
, RxO1, R
x
C2
, RxS2 , R
x
O2
) ∈ Re(p),
and
RC1 ≥ 0, RxC1 ≥ 0, RS1 ≥ 0, RxS1 ≥ 0, RxO1 ≥ 0,
RC2 ≥ 0, RxC2 ≥ 0, RS2 ≥ 0, RxS2 ≥ 0, RxO2 ≥ 0, (4)
for a given joint distribution p. R1(p) is the set of all tuples (RC1 , RxC1 , RS1 , RxS1, RC2 , RxC2 , RxO2) satisfying
RS +R
x
S ≤ I(S; Y1|Sc, Q), ∀S ⊂ {C1, S1, C2, O2}. (5)
R2(p) is the rate region defined by reversing the indices 1 and 2 everywhere in the expression for R1(p).
Re(p) is the set of all tuples (RxC1 , RxS1 , RxO1, RxC2 , RxS2, RxO2) satisfying
RxS ≤ I(S; Ye|Sc, Q), ∀S ( {C1, S1, O1, C2, S2, O2},
RxS = I(S; Ye|Q), S = {C1, S1, O1, C2, S2, O2}. (6)
Proof: We detail the coding scheme here. The rest of the proof, given in Appendix A, shows that
the proposed coding scheme satisfies both the reliability and the security constraints.
Fix some p(q), p(c1|q), p(s1|q), p(o1|q), p(x1|c1, s1, o1), p(c2|q), p(s2|q), p(o2|q), and p(x2|c2, s2, o2) for
the channel given by p(y1, y2, ye|x1, x2). Generate a random typical sequence qn, where p(qn) =
n∏
i=1
p(q(i))
and each entry is chosen i.i.d. according to p(q). Every node knows the sequence qn.
Codebook Generation:
Consider transmitter k ∈ {1, 2} that has secret message Wk ∈ Wk = {1, 2, · · · ,Mk}, where Mk = 2nRk .
We construct each element in the codebook ensemble as follows.
1Here Q,C1, S1, O1, C2, S2, and O2 are defined on arbitrary finite sets Q, C1, S1, O1, C2, S2, and O2, respectively.
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Fig. 3. Proposed encoder structure for the IC-E.
• Generate MCkMxCk = 2
n(RCk+R
x
Ck
−ǫ1) sequences cnk , each with probability p(cnk |qn) =
n∏
i=1
p(ck(i)|q(i)),
where p(ck(i)|q(i)) = p(ck|q) for each i. Distribute these into MCk = 2nRCk bins, where the bin index
is wCk . Each bin has MxCk = 2
n(Rx
Ck
−ǫ1) codewords, where we denote the codeword index as wxCk .
Represent each codeword with these two indices, i.e., cnk(wCk , wxCk).
• Similarly, generate MSkMxSk = 2
n(RSk+R
x
Sk
−ǫ1) sequences snk , each with probability p(snk |qn) =
n∏
i=1
p(sk(i)|q(i)), where p(sk(i)|q(i)) = p(sk|q) for each i. Distribute these into MSk = 2nRSk bins,
where the bin index is wSk . Each bin has MxSk = 2
n(Rx
Sk
−ǫ1) codewords, where we denote the codeword
index as wxSk . Represent each codeword with these two indices, i.e., s
n
k(wSk , w
x
Sk
).
• Finally, generate MxOk = 2
n(RxOk
−ǫ1) sequences onk , each with probability p(onk |qn) =
n∏
i=1
p(ok(i)|q(i)),
where p(ok(i)|q(i)) = p(ok|q) for each i. Denote each sequence by index wxOk and represent each
codeword with this index, i.e., onk(wxOk).
Choose Mk = MCkMSk , and assign each pair (wCk , wSk) to a secret message wk. Note that, Rk =
RCk +RSk for k = 1, 2.
Every node in the network knows these codebooks.
Encoding:
Consider again user k ∈ {1, 2}. To send wk ∈ Wk, user k gets corresponding indices wCk and wSk .
Then user k obtains the following codewords:
• From the codebook for Ck, user k randomly chooses a codeword in bin wCk according to the uniform
distribution, where the codeword index is denoted by wxCk and it gets the corresponding entry of the
codebook, i.e. cnk(wCk , wxCk).
• Similarly, from the codebook for Sk, user k randomly chooses a codeword in bin wSk according to
the uniform distribution, where the codeword index is denoted by wxSk and it gets the corresponding
entry of the codebook, i.e. snk(wSk , wxSk).
• Finally, from the codebook for Ok, it randomly chooses a codeword, which is denoted by onk(wxOk).
Then, user k, generates the channel inputs xnk , where each entry is chosen according to p(xk|ck, sk, ok)
using the codewords cnk(wCk , wxCk), s
n
k(wSk , w
x
Sk
), and onk(wxOk); and it transmits the constructed x
n
k in n
channel uses. See Fig. 3.
Decoding:
Here we remark that although each user needs to decode only its own message, we also require
receivers to decode common and other information of the other transmitter. Suppose receiver 1 has
received yn1 . Let An1,ǫ denote the set of typical (qn, cn1 , sn1 , cn2 , on2 ,yn1 ) sequences. Decoder 1 chooses
(wC1 , w
x
C1
, wS1, w
x
S1
, wC2 , w
x
C2
, wxO2) s.t. (q
n, cn1 (wC1, w
x
C1
), sn1 (wS1, w
x
S1
), cn2(wC2 , w
x
C2
), on2(w
x
O2
), yn1 ) ∈ An1,ǫ,
if such a tuple exists and is unique. Otherwise, the decoder declares an error. Decoding at receiver 2 is
symmetric and a description of it can be obtained by reversing the indices 1 and 2 above.
Refer to Appendix A for the rest of the proof.
The following remarks are now in order.
61) The auxiliary random variable Q serves as a time-sharing parameter.
2) The auxiliary variable C1 is used to construct the common secure signal of transmitter 1 that has
to be decoded at both receivers, where the randomized encoding technique of [13] is used for this
construction. Similarly, C2 is used for the common secured signal of user 2.
3) The auxiliary variable S1 is used to construct the self secure signal that has to be decoded at
receiver 1 but not at receiver 2, where the randomized encoding technique of [13] is used for this
construction. Similarly, S2 is used for the self secure signal of user 2.
4) The auxiliary variable O1 is used to construct the other signal of transmitter 1 that has to be
decoded at receiver 2 but not at receiver 1 (conventional random coding [17] is used to construct
this signal). Similarly, O2 is used for the other signal of user 2. Note that we use RxO1 , RxO2 , and
set RO1 = RO2 = 0.
5) Compared to the Han-Kobayashi scheme [2], the common and self random variables are constructed
with randomized (two-dimensional) codebooks. This way, they are used not only for transmitting
information, but also for adding randomness. Moreover, we have two additional random variables
in this achievability scheme. These extra random variables, namely O1 and O2, are used to facilitate
cooperation among the network users by adding extra randomness to the channel which has to be
decoded by the non-intended receiver. We note that, compared to random variables Ck and Sk, the
randomization added via Ok is considered as interference at the receiver k.
6) The gain that can be leveraged from cooperative encoding can be attributed to the freedom in the
allocation of randomization rates at the two users (e.g., see (6)). This allows the users to cooperatively
add randomness to impair the eavesdropper with a minimal impact on the achievable rate at the
legitimate receivers. Cooperative channel prefixing, on the other hand, can be achieved by the joint
optimization of the probabilistic channel prefixes p(x1|c1, s1, o1) and p(x2|c2, s2, o2).
C. Outer Bounds
Theorem 2: For any (R1, R2) ∈ CIC-E,
R1 ≤ max
p∈PO
I(V1; Y1|V2, U)− I(V1; Ye|U) (7)
R2 ≤ max
p∈PO
I(V2; Y2|V1, U)− I(V2; Ye|U), (8)
where PO is the set of joint distributions that factors as
p(u, v1, v2, x1, x2) = p(u)p(v1|u)p(v2|u)p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2).
Proof: Refer to Appendix B.
Theorem 3: For channels satisfying
I(V2; Y2|V1) ≤ I(V2; Y1|V1) (9)
for any distribution that factors as p(v1, v2, x1, x2) = p(v1)p(v2)p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2), an upper bound on the
sum-rate of the IC-E is given by
R1 +R2 ≤ max
p∈PO
I(V1, V2; Y1|U)− I(V1, V2; Ye|U), (10)
where U , V1, and V2 are auxiliary random variables, and PO is the set of joint distributions that factors
as
p(u, v1, v2, x1, x2) = p(u)p(v1|u)p(v2|u)p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2).
Proof: Refer to Appendix C.
The previous sum-rate upper bound also holds for the set of channels satisfying
I(V2; Y2) ≤ I(V2; Y1) (11)
for any distribution that factors as p(v1, v2, x1, x2) = p(v1)p(v2)p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2). Finally, it is evident that
one can obtain another upper bound by reversing the indices 1 and 2 in above expressions.
7D. Special Cases
This section focuses on few special cases, where sharp results on the secrecy capacity region can
be derived. In all these scenarios, achievability is established using the proposed cooperative encoding
scheme. To simplify the presentation, we first define the following set of probability distributions. For
random variables T1 and T2,
P(T1, T2) ,
{
p(q, t1, t2, x1, x2) | p(q, t1, t2, x1, x2) =p(q)p(t1|q)p(t2|q)p(x1|t1)p(x2|t2)
}
.
Corollary 4: If the IC-E satisfies
I(V2; Y2|V1, Q) ≤ I(V2; Ye|Q)
I(V2; Ye|V1, Q) ≤ I(V2; Y1|Q) (12)
for all input distributions that factors as p(q)p(v1|q)p(v2|q)p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2), then its secrecy capacity
region is given by
CIC-E = the closure of


⋃
p∈P(S1,O2)
RS1(p)

 ,
where RS1(p) is the set of rate-tuples (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ [I(S1; Y1|O2, Q)− I(S1; Ye|Q)]+
R2 = 0, (13)
for any p ∈ P(S1, O2).
Proof: Refer to Appendix D.
Corollary 5: If the IC-E satisfies
I(V2; Ye|Q) ≤ I(V2; Y1|Q) ≤ I(V2; Y2|Q)
I(V1; Ye|V2, Q) ≤ I(V1; Y1|V2, Q)
I(V2; Y2|V1, Q) ≤ I(V2; Y1|V1, Q) (14)
for all input distributions that factors as p(q)p(v1|q)p(v2|q)p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2), then its secrecy sum capacity
is given as follows.
max
(R1,R2)∈CIC-E
R1 +R2 = max
p∈P(S1,C2)
I(S1, C2; Y1|Q)− I(S1, C2; Ye|Q).
Proof: Refer to Appendix E.
Corollary 6: If the IC-E satisfies
I(V2; Ye|Q) ≤ I(V2; Y1|V1, Q) ≤ I(V2; Ye|V1, Q)
I(V2; Y2|V1, Q) ≤ I(V2; Y1|V1, Q) (15)
for all input distributions that factors as p(q)p(v1|q)p(v2|q)p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2), then its secrecy sum capacity
is given as follows.
max
(R1,R2)∈CIC-E
R1 +R2 = max
p∈P(S1,O2)
I(S1, O2; Y1|Q)− I(S1, O2; Ye|Q).
We also note that, in this case, O2 will not increase the sum-rate, and hence, we can set |O2| = 1
Proof: Refer to Appendix F.
Another case for which the cooperative encoding approach can attain the sum-capacity is the following.
8Corollary 7: If the IC-E satisfies
I(V2; Y1|Q) ≤ I(V2; Ye|V1, Q) ≤ I(V2; Y1|V1, Q)
I(V2; Y2|V1, Q) ≤ I(V2; Y1|V1, Q) (16)
for all input distributions that factors as p(q)p(v1|q)p(v2|q)p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2), then its secrecy sum capacity
is given as follows.
max
(R1,R2)∈CIC-E
R1 +R2 = max
p∈P(S1,O2)
I(S1, O2; Y1|Q)− I(S1, O2; Ye|Q).
Proof: Refer to Appendix G.
Now, we use our results on the IC-E to shed more light on the secrecy capacity of the discrete
memoryless multiple access channel. In particular, it is easy to see that the multiple access channel with an
eavesdropper (MAC-E) defined by p(y1, ye|x1, x2) is equivalent to the IC-E defined by p(y1, y2, ye|x1, x2) =
p(y1, ye|x1, x2)δ(y2 − y1). This allows for specializing the results obtained earlier to the MAC-E.
Corollary 8:
RMAC-E , the closure of


⋃
p∈P(C1,C2)
R(p)

 ,
where the channel is given by p(y1, ye|x1, x2)δ(y2 − y1).
Furthermore, the following result characterizes the secrecy sum rate of the weak MAC-E.
Corollary 9 (MAC-E with a weak eavesdropper): If the eavesdropper is weak for the MAC-E, i.e.,
I(V1; Ye|V2) ≤ I(V1; Y1|V2)
I(V2; Ye|V1) ≤ I(V2; Y1|V1), (17)
for all input distributions that factor as p(v1)p(v2)p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2), then the secure sum-rate capacity is
characterized as the following.
max
(R1,R2)∈CMAC-E
R1 +R2 = max
p∈P(C1,C2)
I(C1, C2; Y1|Q)− I(C1, C2; Ye|Q)
Proof: Refer to Appendix H.
Another special case of our model is the relay-eavesdropper channel with a deaf helper. In this scenario,
transmitter 1 has a secret message for receiver 1 and transmitter 2 is only interested in helping transmitter
1 in increasing its secure transmission rates. Here, the random variable O2 at transmitter 2 is utilized to
add randomness to the network. Again, the regions given earlier can be specialized to this scenario. For
example, the following region is achievable for this relay-eavesdropper model.
RRE , the closure of the convex hull of


⋃
p∈P(S1,O2,|Q|=1)
R(p)

 , (18)
where P(S1, O2, |Q| = 1) denotes the probability distributions in P(S1, O2) with a deterministic Q.
For this relay-eavesdropper scenario, the noise forwarding (NF) scheme proposed in [18] achieves the
following rate.
R[NF] = max
p∈P(S1,O2,|Q|=1)
R1(p), (19)
where
R1(p) , [I(S1; Y1|O2) + min{I(O2; Y1), I(O2; Ye|S1)} −min{I(O2; Y1), I(O2; Ye)} − I(S1; Ye|O2)]+.
The following result shows that NF is a special case of the cooperative encoding scheme and provides
a simplification of the achievable secrecy rate.
9Corollary 10: (R[NF], 0) ∈ RRE, where R[NF] can be simplified as follows.
R[NF] = max
p∈P(S1,O2,|Q|=1) s.t. I(O2;Ye)≤I(O2;Y1)
I(S1; Y1|O2) + min{I(O2; Y1), I(O2; Ye|S1)} − I(S1, O2; Ye).(20)
Proof: Refer to Appendix I.
Finally, the next result establishes the optimality of NF in certain relay-eavesdropper channels.
Corollary 11: Noise Forwarding scheme is optimal for the relay-eavesdropper channels which satisfy
I(V2; Y1) ≤ I(V2; Ye|V1), (21)
for all input distributions that factor as p(v1)p(v2)p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2), and the corresponding secrecy capacity
is
CRE = max
p ∈ P(S1, O2, |Q| = 1)
s.t. I(O2;Ye) ≤ I(O2;Y1)
I(S1, O2; Y1)− I(S1, O2; Ye).
Proof: Refer to Appendix J.
III. SECURITY FOR THE GAUSSIAN INTERFERENCE CHANNEL
A. Inner Bound and Numerical Results
In its standard form [19], the two user Gaussian Interference Channel with an Eavesdropper (GIC-E)
is given by
Y1 = X1 +
√
c21X2 +N1
Y2 =
√
c12X1 +X2 +N2 (22)
Ye =
√
c1eX1 +
√
c2eX2 +Ne,
where Nr ∼ N (0, 1) is the noise at each receiver r = 1, 2, e and the average power constraints are
1
n
n∑
t=1
(Xk(t))
2 ≤ Pk for k = 1, 2. The secrecy capacity region of the GIC-E is denoted as CGIC-E.
The goal here is to specialize the results obtained in the previous section to the Gaussian scenario and
illustrate the gains that can be leveraged from the cooperative coding for randomized codebooks and for
channel prefixing, and from time sharing. For this scenario, the Gaussian codebooks are used and the
same regions will be achievable after taking into account the power constraint at the users. Towards this
end, we will need the following definitions. Consider a probability mass function on the time sharing
parameter denoted by p(q). Let A(p(q)) denote the set of all possible power allocations, i.e.,
A(p(q)) ,
{(
P c1 (q), P
s
1 (q), P
o
1 (q), P
j
1 (q), P
c
2 (q), P
s
2 (q), P
o
2 (q), P
j
2 (q)
)∣∣ ∑
q∈Q
(P ck(q) + P
s
k (q) + P
o
k (q) +
P
j
k (q))p(q) ≤ Pk, for k = 1, 2.
}
Now, we define a set of joint distributions PG for the Gaussian case as follows.
PG ,
{
p | p ∈ P, (P c1 (q), P s1 (q), P o1 (q), P j1 (q), P c2 (q), P s2 (q), P o2 (q), P j2 (q)) ∈ A(p(q)),
C1(q) ∼ N (0, P c1 (q)), S1(q) ∼ N (0, P s1 (q)), O1(q) ∼ N (0, P o1 (q)), J1(q) ∼ N (0, P j1 (q)),
C2(q) ∼ N (0, P c2 (q)), S2(q) ∼ N (0, P s2 (q)), O2(q) ∼ N (0, P o2 (q)), J2(q) ∼ N (0, P j2 (q)),
X1(q) = C1(q) + S1(q) +O1(q) + J1(q), X2(q) = C2(q) + S2(q) +O2(q) + J2(q)
}
,
where the Gaussian model given in (22) gives p(y1, y2, ye|x1, x2). Using this set of distributions, we obtain
the following achievable secrecy rate region for the GIC-E.
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Corollary 12: RGIC-E , the closure of
{ ⋃
p∈PG
R(p)
}
⊂ CGIC-E.
It is interesting to see that our particular choice of the channel prefixing distribution p(xk|ck, sk, ok)
in the above corollary corresponds to a superposition coding approach where Xk = Ck + Sk + Ok + Jk.
This observation establishes the fact that noise injection scheme of [15] and jamming scheme of [16] are
special cases of the channel prefixing technique of [14].
The following computationally simple subregion will be used to generate some of our numerical results.
Corollary 13: RGIC-E2 ⊂ RGIC-E ⊂ CGIC-E, where RGIC-E2 , the convex closure of
{ ⋃
p∈PG2
R(p)}, and
PG2 , {p | p ∈ PG, |Q| = 1, P s1 (q) = P o1 (q) = P s2 (q) = P o2 (q) = 0 for any Q = q}.
Another simplification can be obtained from the following TDMA-like approach. Here we divide the
n channel uses into two parts of lengths represented by αn and (1 − α)n, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and αn is
assumed to be an integer. During the first period, transmitter 1 generates randomized codewords using
power P s1 (1) and transmitter 2 jams the channel using power P j2 (1). For the second period, the roles of
the users are reversed, where the users use powers P s2 (2) and P
j
1 (2). We refer to this scheme cooperative
TDMA (C-TDMA) which achieves the following region.
Corollary 14: RC-TDMA ⊂ RGIC-E ⊂ CGIC-E, where
RC-TDMA , the closure of


⋃
α∈[0,1]
αPs
1
(1)+(1−α)P
j
1
(2)≤P1
αP
j
2
(1)+(1−α)Ps
2
(2)≤P2
(R1, R2)


,
where
R1 =
α
2
[
log
(
1 +
P s1 (1)
1 + c21P
j
2 (1)
)
− log
(
1 +
c1eP
s
1 (1)
1 + c2eP
j
2 (1)
)]+
, (23)
and
R2 =
(1− α)
2
[
log
(
1 +
P s2 (2)
1 + c12P
j
1 (2)
)
− log
(
1 +
c2eP
s
2 (2)
1 + c1eP
j
1 (2)
)]+
. (24)
Proof: This is a subregion of the CGIC-E, where we use a time sharing random variable satisfying
p(q = 1) = α and p(q = 2) = 1− α, and utilize the random variables S1 and S2. The proof also follows
by respective single-user Gaussian wiretap channel result [20] with the modified noise variances due to
the jamming signals.
In the C-TDMA scheme above, we only add randomness by noise injection at the helper node.
However, our cooperative encoding scheme (Corollary 12) allows for the implementation of more general
cooperation strategies. For example, in a more general TDMA approach, each user can help the other
via both the design of randomized codebook and channel prefixing (i.e., the noise forwarding scheme
described in Section III-B2). In addition, one can develop enhanced transmission strategies with a time-
sharing random variable of cardinality greater than 2.
We now provide numerical results for the following subregions of the achievable region given in
Corollary 12.
• RGIC-E2 : Here we utilize both cooperative randomized codebook design and channel prefixing.
• RGIC-E2 (rc or cp): Here we utilize either cooperative randomized codebook design (rc) or channel
prefixing (cp) scheme at a transmitter, but not both.
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Fig. 4. Numerical results for GIC-E with c12 = c21 = 1.9, c1e = c2e = 0.5, P1 = P2 = 10. The three schemes, performance of which
are given by RGIC-E2 , RGIC-E2 (rc or cp), and RGIC-E2 (ncp), have the same performance and outperform the ones represented by RC-TDMA and
RC-TDMA(ncp), which achieve the same region.
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Fig. 5. Numerical results for GIC-E with c12 = c21 = 0.6, c1e = c2e = 1.1, P1 = P2 = 10. Only the scheme represented by RC-TDMA
achieves positive rates.
• RGIC-E2 (ncp): Here we only utilize cooperative randomized codebook design, no channel prefixing
(ncp) is implemented.
• RC-TDMA: This region is an example of utilizing both time-sharing and cooperative channel prefixing.
• RC-TDMA(ncp): This region is a subregion of RC-TDMA, for which we set the jamming powers to zero.
The first scenario depicted in Fig. 4 shows the gain offered by the cooperative encoding technique, as
compared with the various cooperative TDMA approaches. Also, it is shown that cooperative channel pre-
fixing does not increase the secrecy rate region in this particular scenario. In Fig. 5, we consider a channel
with a rather capable eavesdropper. In this case, it is straightforward to verify that the corresponding single
user channels have zero secrecy capacities. However, with the appropriate cooperation strategies between
the two interfering users, the two users can achieve non-zero rates (as reported in the figure). In Fig. 6,
we consider an asymmetric scenario, in which the first user has a weak channel to the eavesdropper, but
the second user has a strong channel to the eavesdropper. In this case, the proposed cooperative encoding
technique allows the second user to achieve a positive secure transmission rate, which is not possible by
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Fig. 6. Numerical results for GIC-E with c12 = 1.9, c21 = 1, c1e = 0.5, c2e = 1.6, P1 = P2 = 10. The schemes represented by RC-TDMA
and RC-TDMA(ncp) does not achieve positive rates for user 2.
exploiting only the channel prefixing and time-sharing techniques. In addition, by prefixing the channel,
the second user can help the first one to increase its secure transmission rate. Finally, we note that for
some channel coefficients RC-TDMA outperforms RGIC-E2 and for some others RGIC-E2 outperforms RC-TDMA.
Therefore, in general, the proposed techniques (cooperative randomized codebook design, cooperative
channel prefixing, and time-sharing) should be exploited simultaneously as considered in Corollary 12.
B. Special Cases
1) The Multiple Access Channel: First, we define a set of probability distributions
PG3 ,
{
p | p ∈ PG, P s1 (q) = P o1 (q) = P s2 (q) = P o2 (q) = 0 for any Q = q
}
.
Using this notation, one can easily see that the region RGIC-E in Corollary 12 reduces to the following
achievable secrecy rate region for the Gaussian Multiple Access Channel with an Eavesdropper (GMAC-
E).
RGMAC-E , the closure of
{ ⋃
p∈PG3
R(p)
}
,
where the expressions in the region R(p) are calculated for the channel given by p(y1, ye|x1, x2)δ(y2−y1).
The region RGMAC-E generalizes the one obtained in [16] for the two user case. The underlying reason
is that, in the achievable scheme of [16], the users are either transmitting their codewords or jamming
the channel whereas, in our approach, the users can transmit their codewords and jam the channel
simultaneously. In addition, our cooperative TDMA approach generalizes the one proposed in [16], as we
allow the two users to cooperate in the design of randomized codebooks and channel prefixing during the
time slots dedicated to either one.
2) The Relay-Eavesdropper Channel: In the previous section, we argued that the noise forwarding
(NF) scheme of [18] can be obtained as a special case of our generalized cooperation scheme. Here,
we demonstrate the positive impact of channel prefixing on increasing the achievable secrecy rate of
the Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel. In particular, the proposed region for the Gaussian IC-E, when
specialized to the Gaussian relay-eavesdropper setting, results in
RGRE , closure of the convex hull of
{ ⋃
p∈PG4
R(p)
}
,
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where
PG4 ,
{
p | p ∈ PG, |Q| = 1, P c1 (q) = P o1 (q) = P c2 (q) = P s2 (q) = 0
}
.
One the other hand, noise forwarding with no channel prefixing (GNF-ncp) results in the following
achievable rate.
R[GNF-ncp] =
[
1
2
log (1 + P1)− 1
2
log (1 + c1eP1)
− min
{
1
2
log
(
1 +
c21P2
1 + P1
)
,
1
2
log
(
1 +
c2eP2
1 + c1eP1
)}
+ min
{
1
2
log
(
1 +
c21P2
1 + P1
)
,
1
2
log (1 + c2eP2)
}]+
, (25)
where we choose X1 = S1 ∼ N (0, P1) and X2 = O2 ∼ N (0, P2) in the expression of R[NF] (see also [18]).
Numerically, the positive impact of channel prefixing is illustrated in the following example. First, it
is easy to see that the following secrecy rate is achievable with channel prefixing
R1 =
[
1
2
log
(
1 +
P1
1 + c21P2
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
c1eP1
1 + c2eP2
)]+
,
since (R1, 0) ∈ RGRE (i.e., we set P s1 = P1 and P j2 = P2). Now, we let c1e = c2e = 1 and P1 = P2 = 1,
resulting in R[GNF-ncp] = 0 and R1 > 0 if c21 < 1.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This work considered the two-user interference channel with an (external) eavesdropper. An inner bound
on the achievable secrecy rate region was derived using a scheme that combines cooperative randomized
codebook design, channel prefixing, message splitting, and time-sharing techniques. More specifically,
our achievable scheme allows the two users to cooperatively construct their randomized codebooks and
channel prefixing distributions. Outer bounds are then derived and used to establish the optimality of the
proposed scheme in some special cases. For the Gaussian scenario, channel prefixing was used to allow the
users to transmit independently generated noise samples using a fraction of the available power. Moreover,
as a special case of time sharing, we have developed a novel cooperative TDMA scheme, where a user
can add structured and unstructured noise to the channel during the allocated slot for the other user. It is
shown that this scheme reduces to the noise forwarding scheme proposed earlier for the relay-eavesdropper
channel. In the Gaussian multiple-access setting, our cooperative encoding and channel prefixing scheme
was shown to enlarge the achievable regions obtained in previous works. The most interesting aspect of
our results is, perhaps, the illumination of the role of interference in cooperatively adding randomness to
increase the achievable secrecy rates in multi-user networks.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Probability of Error Analysis:
Below we show that the decoding error probability of user k averaged over the ensemble can be
arbitrarily made small for sufficiently large n. This demonstrates the existence of a codebook with the
property that max(Pe,1, Pe,2) ≤ ǫ, for any given ǫ > 0. The analysis follows from similar arguments given
in [2]. See also [17] for joint typical decoding error computations. Here, for any given ǫ > 0, each receiver
can decode corresponding messages given above with an error probability less than ǫ as n → ∞, if the
rates satisfy the following equations.
RS +R
x
S ≤ I(S; Y1|Sc, Q), ∀S ⊂ {C1, S1, C2, O2}, (26)
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RS +R
x
S ≤ I(S; Y2|Sc, Q), ∀S ⊂ {C1, O1, C2, S2}. (27)
Equivocation Computation:
We first write the following.
H(W1,W2|Ye) = H(WC1 ,WS1,WC2 ,WS2|Ye)
≥ H(WC1 ,WS1,WC2 ,WS2|Ye,Q)
= H(WC1 ,WS1,WC2 ,WS2,Ye|Q)−H(Ye|Q)
= H(C1,S1,O1,C2,S2,O2|Q)−H(Ye|Q)
+H(W,Ye|C1,S1,O1,C2,S2,O2,Q)
−H(C1,S1,O1,C2,S2,O2|W,Ye,Q)
≥ H(C1,S1,O1,C2,S2,O2|Q)−H(Ye|Q)
+H(Ye|C1,S1,O1,C2,S2,O2,Q)
−H(C1,S1,O1,C2,S2,O2|W,Ye,Q)
= H(C1,S1,O1,C2,S2,O2|Q)
−H(C1,S1,O1,C2,S2,O2|W,Ye,Q)
− I(C1,S1,O1,C2,S2,O2;Ye|Q), (28)
where we use the set notation W , (WC1 ,WS1 ,WC2,WS2) to ease the presentation, and the inequalities
are due to the fact that conditioning does not increase entropy,
Here,
H(C1,S1,O1,C2,S2,O2|Q)
= n(RC1 +R
x
C1
+RS1 +R
x
S1
+RxO1 + RC2 +R
x
C2
+RS2 +R
x
S2
+RxO2 − 6ǫ1), (29)
as, given Q = q, the tuple (C1,S1,O1,C2,S2,O2) has 2n(RC1+R
x
C1
+RS1+R
x
S1
+Rx
O1
+RC2+R
x
C2
+RS2+R
x
S2
+Rx
O2
−6ǫ1)
possible values each with equal probability.
Secondly,
I(C1,S1,O1,C2,S2,O2;Ye|Q) ≤ nI(C1, S1, O1, C2, S2, O2; Ye|Q) + nǫ2, (30)
where ǫ2 → 0 as n→∞. See, for example, Lemma 8 of [13].
Lastly, for any WC1 = wC1 , WS1 = wS1 , WC2 = wC2 , WS2 = wS2 , and Q = q, we have
H(C1,S1,O1,C2,S2,O2|WC1 = wC1 ,WS1 = wS1,WC2 = wC2 ,WS2 = wS2 ,Ye,Q = q) ≤ nǫ3,
for some ǫ3 → 0 as n→∞. This is due to the Fano’s inequality together with the randomized codebook
construction: Given all the message (bin) indices of two users, eavesdropper can decode the randomization
indices among those bins. Due to joint typicality, this latter argument holds as long as the rates satisfy
the following equations.
RxS ≤ I(S; Ye|Sc, Q), ∀S ⊂ {C1, S1, O1, C2, S2, O2}. (31)
This follows as given bin indices WC1 , WS1 , WC2 , and WS2 , this reduces to MAC probability of error
computation among the codewords of those bins. See [17] for details of computing error probabilities in
MAC. Then, averaging over WC1 , WS1 , WC2 , WS2 , and Q, we obtain
H(C1,S1,O1,C2,S2,O2|WC1 ,WS1,WC2 ,WS2,Ye,Q) ≤ nǫ3. (32)
Hence, using (29), (30), and (32) in (28) we obtain
R1 +R2 − 1
n
H(W1,W2|Y ne ) ≤ 6ǫ1 + ǫ2 + ǫ3 , ǫ→ 0, (33)
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as n→∞, where we set
RxS = I(S; Ye|Q), S = {C1, S1, O1, C2, S2, O2}. (34)
Combining (26), (27), (31), and (34) we obtain the result, i.e., R(p) is achievable for any p ∈ P .
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We bound R1 below. The bound on R2 can be obtained by following similar steps below and reversing
the indices 1 and 2. We first state the following definitions. For any random variable Y , Y˜i+1 , [Y (i+
1) · · ·Y (n)], and
I1 ,
n∑
i=1
I(Y˜i+1e ; Y1(i)|Yi−11 ) (35)
Iˆ1 ,
n∑
i=1
I(Yi−11 ; Ye(i)|Y˜i+1e ) (36)
I2 ,
n∑
i=1
I(Y˜i+1e ; Y1(i)|Yi−11 ,W1) (37)
Iˆ2 ,
n∑
i=1
I(Yi−11 ; Ye(i)|Y˜i+1e ,W1) (38)
Then, we consider the following bound.
R1 − ǫ ≤ 1
n
H(W1|Ye)
=
1
n
(H(W1)− I(W1;Ye))
=
1
n
(H(W1|Y1) + I(W1;Y1)− I(W1;Ye))
≤ ǫ1 + 1
n
(
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y1(i)|Yi−11 )−
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Ye(i)|Y˜i+1e )
)
= ǫ1 +
1
n
( n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y1(i)|Yi−11 , Y˜i+1e ) + I1 − I2−
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Ye(i)|Yi−11 , Y˜i+1e )− Iˆ1 + Iˆ2
)
= ǫ1 +
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y1(i)|Yi−11 , Y˜i+1e )−
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Ye(i)|Yi−11 , Y˜i+1e )
)
,
where the first inequality is due to Lemma 15 given at the end of this section, the second inequality is
due to the Fano’s inequality at the receiver 1 with some ǫ1 → 0 as n → ∞, the last equality is due to
observations I1 = Iˆ1 and I2 = Iˆ2 (see [14, Lemma 7]).
We define U(i) , (Yi−11 , Y˜i+1e , i), V1(i) , (U(i),W1), and V2(i) , (U(i),W2). Using standard
techniques (see, e.g., [17]), we introduce a random variable J , which is uniformly distributed over
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{1, · · · , n}, and continue as below.
R1 − ǫ ≤ ǫ1 + 1
n
(
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y1(i)|Yi−11 , Y˜i+1e )−
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Ye(i)|Yi−11 , Y˜i+1e )
)
= ǫ1 +
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
I(V1(i); Y1(i)|U(i))−
n∑
i=1
I(V1(i); Ye(i)|U(i))
)
= ǫ1 +
n∑
j=1
I(V1(j); Y1(j)|U(j))p(J = j)−
n∑
j=1
I(V1(j); Ye(j)|U(j))p(J = j)
≤ ǫ1 +
n∑
j=1
I(V1(j); Y1(j)|V2(j), U(j))p(J = j)−
n∑
j=1
I(V1(j); Ye(j)|U(j))p(J = j)
= ǫ1 + I(V1; Y1|V2, U)− I(V1; Ye|U), (39)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that V1(j)→ U(j)→ V2(j), which implies
I(V1(j); Y1(j)|U(j)) ≤ I(V1(j); Y1(j)|V2(j), U(j)),
after using the fact that conditioning does not increase entropy, and the last equality follows by using
a standard information theoretic argument in which we define random variables for the single-letter
expression, e.g., V1 has the same distribution as V1(J). Hence, we obtain the bound,
R1 ≤ [I(V1; Y1|V2, U)− I(V1; Ye|U)]+ , (40)
for some auxiliary random variables that factors as p(u)p(v1|u)p(v2|u)p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2)p(y1, y2, ye|x1, x2).
Lemma 15: The secrecy constraint
R1 +R2 − 1
n
H(W1,W2|Ye) ≤ ǫ
implies that
R1 − 1
n
H(W1|Ye) ≤ ǫ,
and
R2 − 1
n
H(W2|Ye) ≤ ǫ.
Proof:
1
n
H(W1|Ye) = 1
n
H(W1,W2|Ye)− 1
n
H(W2|Ye,W1)
≥ R1 − ǫ+R2 − 1
n
H(W2|Ye,W1)
= R1 − ǫ+ 1
n
H(W2)− 1
n
H(W2|Ye,W1)
≥ R1 − ǫ, (41)
where the second equality follows by H(W2) = nR2, and the last inequality follows due to the fact that
conditioning does not increase entropy. Second statement follows from a similar observation.
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
From arguments given in [5, Lemma], the assumed property of the channel implies the following.
I(V2;Y2|V1) ≤ I(V2;Y1|V1) (42)
Then, by considering V1(i) = W1 and V2(i) = W2, for i = 1, · · · , n, we get
I(W2;Y2|W1) ≤ I(W2;Y1|W1) (43)
We continue as follows.
1
n
H(W1,W2|Y1) = 1
n
H(W1|Y1) + 1
n
H(W2|Y1,W1)
≤ ǫ1 + 1
n
H(W2|Y1,W1)
≤ ǫ1 + 1
n
H(W2|Y2,W1)
≤ ǫ1 + 1
n
H(W2|Y2)
≤ ǫ1 + ǫ2, (44)
where the first inequality is due to the Fano’s inequality at the receiver 1 with some ǫ1 → 0 as n→∞,
the second inequality follows from (43), the third one is due to conditioning can not increase entropy,
and the last one follows from the Fano’s inequality at the receiver 2 with some ǫ2 → 0 as n→∞.
We then proceed following the standard techniques given in [13], [14]. We first state the following
definitions.
I1 ,
n∑
i=1
I(Y˜i+1e ; Y1(i)|Yi−11 ) (45)
Iˆ1 ,
n∑
i=1
I(Yi−11 ; Ye(i)|Y˜i+1e ) (46)
I3 ,
n∑
i=1
I(Y˜i+1e ; Y1(i)|Yi−11 ,W1,W2) (47)
Iˆ3 ,
n∑
i=1
I(Yi−11 ; Ye(i)|Y˜i+1e ,W1,W2), (48)
where Y˜i+1 = [Y (i+ 1) · · ·Y (n)] for random variable Y .
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Then, we bound the sum rate as follows.
R1 +R2 − ǫ ≤ 1
n
H(W1,W2|Ye)
=
1
n
(
H(W1,W2|Y1) + I(W1,W2;Y1)− I(W1,W2;Ye)
)
≤ ǫ1 + ǫ2 + 1
n
(
n∑
i=1
I(W1,W2; Y1(i)|Yi−11 )−
n∑
i=1
I(W1,W2; Ye(i)|Y˜i+1e )
)
= ǫ1 + ǫ2 +
1
n
(
I1 − I3 − Iˆ1 + Iˆ3+
n∑
i=1
I(W1,W2; Y1(i)|Yi−11 , Y˜i+1e )
−
n∑
i=1
I(W1,W2; Ye(i)|Yi−11 , Y˜i+1e )
)
= ǫ1 + ǫ2 +
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
I(W1,W2; Y1(i)|Yi−11 , Y˜i+1e )−
n∑
i=1
I(W1,W2; Ye(i)|Yi−11 , Y˜i+1e )
)
,
where the first inequality is due to the secrecy requirement, the last inequality follows by (44), and the
last equality follows by the fact that I1 = Iˆ1 and I3 = Iˆ3, which can be shown using arguments similar
to [14, Lemma 7].
We define U(i) , (Yi−11 , Y˜i+1e , i), V1(i) , (U(i),W1), and V2(i) , (U(i),W2). Using standard
techniques (see, e.g., [17]), we introduce a random variable J , which is uniformly distributed over
{1, · · · , n}, and continue as below.
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
I(W1,W2; Y1(i)|Yi−11 , Y˜i+1e )−
n∑
i=1
I(W1,W2; Ye(i)|Yi−11 , Y˜i+1e )
)
=
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
I(V1(i), V2(i); Y1(i)|U(i))−
n∑
i=1
I(V1(i), V2(i); Ye(i)|U(i))
)
=
n∑
j=1
I(V1(j), V2(j); Y1(j)|U(j))p(J = j)−
n∑
j=1
I(V1(j), V2(j); Ye(j)|U(j))p(J = j)
= I(V1, V2; Y1|U)− I(V1, V2; Ye|U), (49)
where, using a standard information theoretic argument, we have defined the random variables for the
single-letter expression, e.g., V1 has the same distribution as V1(J). Now, due to the memoryless property of
the channel, we have (U, V1, V2)→ (X1, X2)→ (Y1, Y2, Ye), which implies p(y1, y2, ye|x1, x2, v1, v2, u) =
p(y1, y2, ye|x1, x2). As we define V1(J) = (U(J),W1) and V2(J) = (U(J),W2), we have V1 → U → V2,
which implies p(v1, v2|u) = p(v1|u)p(v2|u). Finally, as X1(J) is a stochastic function of W1, X2(J) is a
stochastic function of W2, and W1 and W2 are independent, we have X1(J)→ V1(J)→ V2(J), X2(J)→
V2(J)→ V1(J), and X1(J)→ (V1(J), V2(J))→ X2(J), which together implies that p(x1, x2|v1, v2, u) =
p(x1, x2|v1, v2) = p(x1|v1, v2)p(x2|v1, v2) = p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2).
Using this in the above equation, we obtain a sum-rate bound,
R1 +R2 ≤ [I(V1, V2; Y1|U)− I(V1, V2; Ye|U)]+ , (50)
for some auxiliary random variables that factors as p(u)p(v1|u)p(v2|u)p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2)p(y1, y2, ye|x1, x2),
if (9) holds.
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Achievability follows from Theorem 1 by only utilizing S1 and O2 together with the second equation
in (12), where we set R2 = 0 and set R1 as follows. For a given p ∈ P(S1, O2), if I(S1; Y1|O2, Q) ≤
I(S1; Ye|Q), we set R1 = 0; otherwise we assign the following rates.
RS1 = I(S1; Y1|O2, Q)− I(S1; Ye|Q)
RxS1 = I(S1; Ye|Q)
RxO2 = I(O2; Ye|S1, Q),
where R1 = RS1 .
Converse follows from Theorem 2. That is, if (R1, R2) is achieavable, then R1 ≤ max
p∈PO
I(S1; Y1|O2, Q)−
I(S1; Ye|Q) and R2 = 0, due to the first condition given in (12).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF COROLLARY 5
Achievability follows from Theorem 1 by only utilizing S1 and C2 together with the channel condition
given in (14). For a given p ∈ P(S1, C2), if I(S1, C2; Y1|Q) ≤ I(S1, C2; Ye|Q), we set R1 = R2 = 0;
otherwise we assign the following rates.
RS1 = I(S1; Y1|C2, Q)− I(S1; Ye|C2, Q)
RxS1 = I(S1; Ye|C2, Q)
RC2 = I(C2; Y1|Q)− I(C2; Ye|Q)
RxC2 = I(C2; Ye|Q),
where R1 = RS1 and R2 = RC2 .
Converse follows from Theorem 3 as the needed condition is satisfied by the channel.
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Achievability follows from Theorem 1 by only utilizing S1 and O2 together with the channel condition
given in (15). For a given p ∈ P(S1, O2), if I(S1, O2; Y1|Q) ≤ I(S1, O2; Ye|Q), we set R1 = R2 = 0;
otherwise we assign the following rates.
RS1 = I(S1, O2; Y1|Q)− I(S1, O2; Ye|Q)
RxS1 = I(S1, O2; Ye|Q)− I(O2; Y1|S1, Q)
RxO2 = I(O2; Y1|S1, Q),
where R1 = RS1 and R2 = 0.
Converse follows from Theorem 3 as the needed condition is satisfied by the channel.
APPENDIX G
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Achievability follows from Theorem 1 by only utilizing S1 and O2 together with the channel condition
given in (16). For a given p ∈ P(S1, O2), if I(S1, O2; Y1|Q) ≤ I(S1, O2; Ye|Q), we set R1 = R2 = 0;
otherwise we assign the following rates.
RS1 = I(S1, O2; Y1|Q)− I(S1, O2; Ye|Q)
RxS1 = I(S1; Ye|Q)
RxO2 = I(O2; Ye|S1, Q),
where R1 = RS1 and R2 = 0.
Converse follows from Theorem 3 as the needed condition is satisfied by the channel.
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For a given MAC-E with p(y1, ye|x1, x2), we consider an IC-E defined by
p(y1, y2, ye|x1, x2) = p(y1, ye|x1, x2)δ(y2 − y1)
and utilize Theorem 1 with p ∈ P(C1, C2) satisfying (17). Then, the achievable region becomes
R1 = RC1 ≤ I(C1; Y1|C2, Q)− RxC1
R2 = RC2 ≤ I(C2; Y1|C1, Q) +RxC1 − I(C1, C2; Ye|Q),
R1 +R2 = RC1 +RC2 ≤ I(C1, C2; Y1|Q)− I(C1, C2; Ye|Q), (51)
where I(C1; Ye|Q) ≤ RxC1 ≤ I(C1; Ye|C2, Q) and RxC2 = I(C1, C2; Ye|Q) − RxC1 . Hence, R1 + R2 =
[I(C1, C2; Y1|Q)− I(C1, C2; Ye|Q)]+ is achievable for any p ∈ P(C1, C2) satisfying (17).
The following outer bound on the sum rate follows by Theorem 3, as the constructed IC-E satisfies the
needed condition of the theorem.
R1 +R2 ≤ I(C1, C2; Y1|Q)− I(C1, C2; Ye|Q),
for any p ∈ P(C1, C2). Which is what needed to be shown.
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We first remark that R[NF] will remain the same if we restrict the union over the set of probability
distributions
P˜(S1, O2, |Q| = 1) , {p | p ∈ P(S1, O2, |Q| = 1), I(O2; Ye) ≤ I(O2; Y1)}.
As for any p ∈ P(S1, O2, |Q| = 1) satisfying I(O2; Ye) ≥ I(O2; Y1), R1(p) = [I(S1; Y1|O2) −
I(S1; Ye|O2)]+ since I(O2; Y1) ≤ I(O2; Ye) ≤ I(O2; Ye|S1) in this case. And the highest rate achievable
with the NF scheme occurs if O2 is chosen to be deterministic, and hence I(O2; Y1) = I(O2; Ye) case
will result in the highest rate among the probability distributions p ∈ P(S1, O2, |Q| = 1) satisfying
I(O2; Ye) ≥ I(O2; Y1). Therefore, without loss of generality, we can write
R[NF] = max
p∈P˜(S1,O2,|Q|=1)
R1(p),
where R1(p) = [I(S1; Y1|O2) + min{I(O2; Y1), I(O2; Ye|S1)} − I(S1, O2; Ye)]+.
Now, fix some p ∈ P˜(S1, O2, |Q| = 1), and set RxO2 = min{I(O2; Y1), I(O2; Ye|S1)}, RxS1 = I(S1, O2; Ye)−
min{I(O2; Y1), I(O2; Ye|S1)}, and RS1 = I(S1; Y1|O2) − I(S1, O2; Ye) + min{I(O2; Y1), I(O2; Ye|S1)},
where we set R1 = 0 if the latter is negative. Here,
R1 =
[
I(S1; Y1|O2) + min{I(O2; Y1), I(O2; Ye|S1)} − I(S1, O2; Ye)
]+
is achievable, i.e., (R1(p), 0) ∈ RRE for any p ∈ P˜(S1, O2, |Q| = 1). Observing that (R[NF], 0) ∈ RRE, we
conclude that the noise forwarding (NF) scheme of [18] is a special case of the proposed scheme.
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For any given p ∈ P(S1, O2, |Q| = 1) satisfying I(O2; Ye) ≤ I(O2; Y1), we see that R1 = [I(S1, O2; Y1)−
I(S1, O2; Ye)]
+ is achievable due to (21) and Corollary 10. The converse follows by Theorem 3 as the
needed condition is satisfied by considering an IC-E defined as p(y1, ye|x1, x2)δ(y2 − y1), where we set
|Q| = 1 in the upper bound as the time sharing random variable is not needed for this scenario, and further
limit the input distributions to satisfy I(O2; Ye) ≤ I(O2; Y1). The latter does not reduce the maximization
for the upper bound due to a similar reasoning given in the Proof of Corollary 10.
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